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ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION, 
AND THE MACROECONOMY 
Peter C. Carstensen• 
We live in troubled economic times.1 Inflation combined with 
unemployment and a lack of economic growth has produced 
"stagflation." The problems of meeting the world's need for en-
ergy and food insure that all of the world, including this coun-
try, will experience radical change in economic conditions in the 
years ahead. 
Inflation, unemployment, and growth, classically, are regarded 
as outcomes of the relationship of aggregate supply and demand 
in the economy. 9 A hundred years ago, people might not have 
expected government to solve the problems of inflation and un-
employment. 8 Rising expectations, however, resting at least par-
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A., 1964, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin; LL.B., M.A., 1968, Yale University. 
' The prices of consumer goods are now almost two and one-half times what they were 
thirteen years ago. Using 1967 prices as a base of 100, by May of 1980 the price index 
stood at 244.9. Table 2.15, Consumer and Producer Prices, 66 FED. REs. BULL. A51 (July 
1980). Unemployment has at the same time remained high, reaching levels of higher than 
seven percent of those actively seeking employment. See Table 2.12, Labor Fort;e, Em-
ployment and Unemployment, 66 FED. REs. BULL. A47 (Aug. 1980). The unemployment 
rate was seven percent for all of 1977 and for the second quarter of 1980. Finally, the 
growth of the economy (its production of more goods and services) has declined. See The 
U.S. Productivity Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 8, 1980, at 53; but see Winter, Many Busi-
nesses Blame Governmental Policies for Productivity Lag, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1980, at 
1, col. 6 (reports that productivity and growth lags overstated). Growth is also a continu-
ing economic necessity. Growth makes possible an expanding total of goods and services 
from which new and altered demands by specific groups or newly recognized social needs 
can be satisfied. It alao provides the economic context in which added workers can be 
absorbed into the economy without forcing wages down, and it insures that an expanding 
population can continue to enjoy the same or greater relative income. 
• When demand exceeds supply, prices increase and inflation occurs. When demand is 
less than supply, unemployment and recession occur. As the capacity of the economy to 
-supply demand expands, economic growth occurs. In an ideally balanced economy, sup-
ply grows at the rate necessary to absorb all new labor and net savings in the economy 
while demand grows at the rate needed to absorb all new supply. In such a situation 
there is full employment and no price increases. 
Conceptually, the phenomenon of inflation and that of unemployment as well as 
growth are not necessarily interrelated. It is generally recognized that full employment 
can exist even as deflation occurs. Indeed this was the history of price levels in the 
United States for much of the last third of the 19th century. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 201 (1975). 
• American government has long been committed to assisting and directing economic 
growth. From Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures (Dec. 1791), partially re-
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tially on past successes, now impose upon government policy 
makers the obligation to control inflation, minimize unemploy-
ment and induce reasonable economic growth. 4 Over the past 
three decades, the instruments used to achieve these objectives 
have been fiscal actions (tax and spending decisions) and mone-
tary controls designed to affect specific, aggregate economic at-
tributes. More recently, wage and price controls, previously used 
in war time situations,a have received renewed interest and use.8 
The increased use of these tools rests upon the view that many 
of the causes of current problems reside in the structure of 
economy.7 
This article examines the links between antitrust law-one 
possible tool for dealing with economic ills-and macroeconomic 
structure. It analyzes the current policy and economic assump-
tions underlying the importance of antitrust enforcement in 
reaching a healthy, competitive economy and concludes that 
such enforcement does contribute to the increased effectiveness 
of macroeconomic tools. 
Part I explores the current macroeconomic theories and their 
policy implications. Part II discusses the related concepts of 
market power and competition and concludes that dissipation of 
market power is preferable, but that the regulation of market 
printed in 1 THE PEOPLE SHALL JUDGE 401 (The Staff, Social Sciences 1, The College of 
the University of Chicago ed. 1949) through the Homestead _Act, Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 
75, 12 Stat. 392, to the current subsidy programs for energy conservation and synthetic 
fuels, government has very actively involved itself in trying to stimulate specific eco-
nomic activity. Until very recently, however, no similar obligation existed as to employ-
ment or relative price levels. 
• See, e.g., Employment Act of 1946, ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23, and the Full Employment and 
Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat. 1887. 
• E. REDFORD, ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTROL (1952). 
8 The first peace time use was authorized early in the 1970's, Economic Stabilization 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, and was imple-
mented in various ways from 1971 until 1974. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. 
Reg. 15,727 (1971). See also T. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ECONOMIC REGULATION 
OF BUSINESS 332-59 (1976); R. LANZILLETl'I, M. HAMILTON & R. ROBERTS, PHASE II IN 
REVIEW: THE PRICE COMMISSION EXPERIENCE (1975); A. WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STA· 
BILITY (1973). 
7 See, e.g., A. EICHNER, THE MEGACORP AND OLIGOPOLY (1976); B. KLEIN, DYNAMIC EC-
ONOMICS (1977); L. THuaow, THE ZERo SuM SOCIETY (1980); Muller, Industrial Concen-
tration: An Important lnfl.ationary Force, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW 
LEARNING 280 (H. Goldschmid, H. Munn & J. Weston eds. 1974); Feiwel, Macroeconomic 
Theorizing and the Instability of Post-Keynesian Capitalism, 14 J. EcoN. ISSUES 525, 
531 (1980) ("Inflation seems to be deeply rooted in the institutional, market, and non-
competitive arrangements and attitudes in the interlocked postwar private and public 
economy."); Ross & Wachter, Wage Determination, Infiation and the Industrial Struc-
ture, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 675 (1973); Sherman, Monopoly Power and Stagfl,ation, 11 J. 
EcoN. IssUEs 269 (1977). See also Wachter & Williamson, Obligational Markets and the 
Mechanics of Infl,ation, 9 BELL J. ECON. 549 (1978). 
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power may yield significant social and economic benefits in the 
short run, when dissipation is impossible. Finally, Part III exam-
ines the role of antitrust policy in the macroeconomy. The arti-
cle concludes that effective enforcement of antitrust law is con-
sistent with and beneficial to a healthy, competitive economy, 
and should be preserved and expanded as a tool for combating 
economie stagnation. 
I. MACROECONOMIC THEORIES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Demand-Oriented Theories 
For the purposes of this article, the most useful way to view 
the economy is to focus on the total production and sale of 
goods and services. The level of such activity is set by the inter-
action of total or aggregate demand, and the aggregate capacity 
and willingness of the economy to supply what is demanded. 
Traditional macroeconomic analysis, both Keynesian and 
monetarist, holds that the proper focus of aggregate economic 
policy is on the demand side of the equation. Supply is implic-
itly or explicitly assumed to have a given and predictable char-
acter. Hence, by adjusting demand a proper balance to aggregate 
supply can be maintained. The twd schools of thought, however, 
diverge as to the ways and means of controlling demand. 
1. The monetarist school-According to the monetarists, the 
source of inflationary pressue is in an excess money supply rela-
tive to goods and services being produced.8 In this model, con-
trolling the supply of money alone is sufficient to control infla-
tion. 9 Unemployment is not related directly to inflation but 
reflects a "real" non-monetary economy.10 This economy is said 
to have a tendency to full employment and balanced growth as 
inherent features. 11 It can get out of adjustment because of er-
• See Laidler & Parkin, Inflation: A Survey, 85 EcoN. J. 741 (1975). "Excess," as used 
here, is a relative concept. Given any point in time, there is a relationship of money to a 
level of goods and services. H the amount of goods and services produced grows, the 
money supply must also grow in a pro rata way in order to hold price constant. If it does 
not grow at least that much, money will be relatively more scarce than the supply of 
goods. Prices, in money terms, will then fall (deflation). If the money supply grows rela-
tively faster than the supplies of goods and services expand, the relative excess of money 
will cause a bidding up of money prices, which translates into inflation. 
• Id. at 741. 
•• Id. at 778. 
u Id. 
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rors in judgment; but prices and wages then fall, causing re-
newed expansion and a return of the economy to full capacity.11 
This approach assumes that non-monetary demand is an inde-
pendent function which will stabilize in the long run at a level 
sufficient to support an optimal level of both growth and 
employment. 
The primary policy implication of the monetarist approach is 
that government should not interfere with the market adjust-
ment process. Any action which inhibits free wage or price 
change will delay the smooth working of economic readjustment 
and recovery. In practical terms, this means that government 
should avoid subsidies, regulation of wage rates, tariff protec-
tion, as well as monopolies and cartels-all of which may delay 
the adjustment of supply prices necessary to stimulate de-
mand. 18 The only positive role for government is to regulate the 
money supply to keep it in balance with real aggregate supply 
and demand. 
2. The Keynesian model-Initially, the Keynesian approach 
focused on the problems of unemployment and · recession.14 
Keynes argued that the economy has no natural, self-correcting 
quality and so could stablize at very high levels of unemploy-
ment with little or no growth. The core of the problem is that 
aggregate demand, and specifically demand for investment 
goods, depends on expectations about the future. People would 
not invest in new plants and equipment ( thus stimulating eco-
nomic expansion) if they believed that the demand for the out-
put of such investment would not exist. Supply thus depends on 
demand, and demand requires affirmative stimulation. 
Keynes identified government fiscal action as the key stimulus 
to demand. Funding public works or other direct economic ex-
penditure would stimulate the economy toward levels consistent 
with both full employment and long term optimal growth. The 
Keynesian prescription, however, is slightly vague on the ques-
tion of inflation. Keynes recognized that excess money supply 
causes inflation in some cases.111 However, in theory, any excess 
direct stimulation could produce the same results. Hence, when 
the economy begins to overheat, the government has to stand 
ready to cut back on its demand-stimulating activity, and try 
instead to lessen demand by cutting its expenditures and in-
'" For a model of this pattern see Laidler & Parkin, supra note 8, at 777-78. 
•• Kreidmann, Inflation: Quest for Solutions, 25 N.Y. L. Sen. L. REV. 527 (1980). 
" See J. KEYNEs, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936). 
10 Trevithick, Keynes, Inflation and Money Illusion, 85 EcoN. J. 101 (1975). 
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creasing taxes. Out of such an analysis came a belief that the 
economy could be "fine-tuned" through the combined use of 
monetary and fiscal instruments including taxes, interest rates, 
money supply and government spending. 
3. Market policy ramifications of the Keynesian and 
monetarist models- For this article, the significance of both the 
Keynesian and monetarist approaches is that each presupposes 
that the microeconomic, supply phenomenon, on which the 
macro-demand controlling policy operated, would perform in a 
predictable way. Moreover, both approaches fundamentally as-
sume that specific markets are workably competitive so that 
nothing would substantially interfere with the impact of aggre-
gate demand affecting actions.16 Thus, there is implicit in both 
models a similar expectation about substantial competition in 
the market place. Both models lack an articulate, specific analy-
sis of growth in terms of stimulating specifically desirable con-
duct such as innovation and improved productivity. This reflects 
the essentially static, short-run quality of such approaches.17 
This section discusses, first, the argument that demand-ori-
ented policy is not indifferent to changes in market power. The 
second policy implication of the models examined in this section 
is the impact of alternative levels of competiveness in the econ-
omy on the effectiveness of aggregate demand policy. 
The proposition that both demand-oriented theories are not 
indifferent to changes in market power is easily demonstrated. 
Cartelization, for example, is objectionable under either theory. 
If firms in a substantial industry were to band together and cre-
ate a cartel which would increase the product price considerably, 
the aggregate effect would be to stimulate inflation. Breaking up 
the cartel would produce more supply at a given level of de-
mand. This would weaken inflationary pressure and stimulate 
employment. 
Similarly, a merger resulting in monopoly18 is objectionable 
because it, too, will result in a reduction of output at any level of 
demand because of the desire to achieve monopoly profit. Hence, 
eliminating unnecessary monopoly power and obstructing its 
creation are policies not only consistent with demand-oriented 
aggregate policy but essential, though perhaps minor, aspects of 
insuring the effectiveness of such policy.19 More expansively, if 
•• See Wiles, Cost Inflation and the State of Economic Theory, 83 EcoN. J. 377, 379 
(1973). 
17 B. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 26-28. 
•• See Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 144 (1964). 
10 ff, instead of assuming a newly created cartel or other restriction arising as demand 
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any merger or course of conduct tends to create enhanced mar-
ket power in a firm or facilitates the creation or enhancement of 
shared power, this development creates a risk of undesirable 
macroeconomic effects. Such effects may be offset by a sufficient 
increase in productive efficiency resulting from the merger or 
conduct. Moreover, to the extent that use of such power can be 
regulated effectively, its existence would not be troublesome 
from a macro-policy perspective. 
The foregoing situations involve basically "one-shot" impacts 
on the aggregate supply-demand relationship.20 Hence, after the 
economy has adjusted to the new level of supply, no further im-
pact will occur. Although the impact is limited, neither Keyne-
sian- nor monetarist-oriented policy ought to object to such en-
forcement activity generally. Indeed, both approaches should 
encourage enforcement even if this is a less productive activity 
in the long term compared to other policies. 
A difference in views may emerge between the monetarist and 
Keynesian approach when the restraint occurs at the point when 
demand is declining and the problem is one of recession. Here 
the monetarist should still clearly favor breaking up existing and 
barring new cartels or other sources of unnecessary market 
power because they produce distortions in market prices. The 
solution to a recession is to reduce prices to the level necessary 
to induce renewed investment and growth.11 
expands, one hypothesizes a continuing cartel, the analysis is not significantly altered. 
Elimination of a restraint on market power in a significant sector will tend to expand 
output and retard or reverse price increase, thus producing a greater supply at any price 
(or demand). 
Elimination of resale price control over GE light bulbs, for example, produced a signif-
icant price reduction. See R. POSNER, ANTrrausT CASES, EcoNOMIC NOTES, AND OrHER 
MATERIALS 245 (1974). Threats of antitrust action arguably induced the steel industry to 
restrain price increases in the 1960's. See Mueller, Monopoly and the Inflation-Unem-
ployment Dilemma: Trust Busting or Administrative 'Controls'?, 5 ANTITRUST L. & 
EcoN. REv., No. 4, 15 (1972). 
•• See Mueller, Monopoly Power as the Cause of Inflation: An Introduction to the 
'One-Shot Affair' Defense, 7 ANTrrauST L. & EcoN. REv. No. 2, 109 (1974-75); but see L. 
THUROW, supra note 7, 69-73 (such one-shot impacts, if substantial, may still be very 
effective). 
"' The monetarist approach might have an ambivalence which stems from a different 
source. The theory as it relates to real economic affairs posits that this is the "best of all 
possible worlds" and that non-intervention in economic affairs is the best solution. It 
may follow that any observed market power is the product of efficiency which makes 
such dominance necessary. Unnecessary restraints, i.e., those which do not produce sig-
nificant, not otherwise achievable, efficiency, unless imbedded in enforceable legal com-
mands, are not likely to be effective because of the incentives for participants to cheat 
and because of entry whenever prices diverge unreasonably from cost. See Demsetz, Two 
Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 
164 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974). This view of the continuing 
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The Keynesian view is more ambivalent. The primary remedy 
is to stimulate demand by direct government action. Such stim-
ulation can be frustrated if the stimulated industry creates a 
cartel and raises prices more than output. Government action to 
stimulate demand is also supposed to stimulate private invest-
ment decisions which provide both an attractive rate for savings 
and stimulate the productit>n of investment goods. A vigorous 
antitrust policy may thus be counterproductive in a recovery pe-
. riod. To the extent that enforcement eliminates restraints on 
competition, such a policy may reduce the expected future re-
. turns of the firms who were acting anticompetitively. It is, none-
theless, uncertain whether this negative effect is greater than the 
~ffect that cartel or others' such restrictive behavior was gener-
ating before enforcement. At best, the Keynesian approach is 
more ambivalent about vigorous pursuit of competition in this 
stage of an economic cycle. 
Having examined the relevance of changes in market power to 
formulating demand-oriented policy, it becomes necessary to 
discuss the impact of alternative levels of competitiveness within 
the economy on the effectiveness of aggregate demand policy. 
The textbook answer is that the degree of competition does not 
greatly influence the effectiveness of demand tools. This is true 
only if a monopolist (or powerful firm) and a competitive firm 
respond in equally predictable ways to demand changes. Unfor-
tunately, even neoclassical theory of the firm suggests that there 
is a radical difference in response to identical demand. A compe-
titive firm is a price taker. It can manipulate only its output. A 
firm with monopoly power is a price setter. It must decide on 
price either directly or by a choice of output. 22 The key objection 
over the years to monopoly is just this characteristic: the mo-
nopolist can select at its sole discretion the price, output, and 
quality formulation that it desires, unrestrained by any competi-
tion in that product industry.ll8 A monopolist will respond as 
predictably as a competitive firm to demand if it is assumed that 
a monopolist34 only seeks to maximize its profits in the short 
perfection of specific markets is not necessary to the monetarist approach, but it does fit 
easily with it and reflects premises with which that theory is comfortable. Even so, it 
would suggest that where government action creates restraints, there, at least, a more 
competitive policy could be pursued with desirable aggregate effect . 
.. See Wiles, supra note 16, at 384-90; K. COHEN & R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FIRM 190 
(1965). 
18 See, e.g., Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) . 
.. Monopolist here includes single firm monopoly as well as multi-firm cartels or oth-
erwise shared monopoly. 
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run. In such a case there is a profit maximizing point at which 
the additional cost of producing one more unit is precisely equal 
to the additional profit to be derived from the sale of one more 
unit. 16 There are also a number of other output points which a 
monopolist may believe to be more attractive in terms of profit 
maximization over time, taking account of long term demand. 28 
Thus, firms with market power have some choice over price 
and output, and over time those choices vary. This suggests that 
trying to conduct effective macro policy through a monopoly in-
terface, if monopolistic decisions are not carefully regulated, in-
troduces a potentially substantial uncertainty. 
It follows that each of the demand-oriented policies must deal 
with the real and continuing problem of market power in con-
nection with the implementation and effectiveness of any de-
mand-oriented instrument. Indeed, this substantially explains 
the emerging consensus among economists to dismantle major 
regulatory schemes in the area of transportation,27 and to mini-
mize regulation in banking98 and securities markets. 29 
A demand-oriented policy analysis should take into account 
the presence of market power in an industry even where such 
power is unavoidable in the effort to produce efficiently. Unregu-
lated power has the potential to distort and frustrate the imple-
mentation of demand-controlling policy. Hence, to the extent 
that regulatory control over power is feasible, it should receive 
consideration as an element in the overall macro policy arsenal. 
Inpeed, if regulation is feasible, it might substitute for competi-
tion generally. An optimistic view of the wage-price controls of 
the early 1970's seems to justify this conclusion. 
B. Supply-Oriented Theories 
The supply-side approach to inflation, unemployment and 
""See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(1970). 
•• See K. COHEN & R. CYERT, supra note 22, 197-98. The specific example is limit 
pricing to deter entry, but it illustrates the discretion of the monopolist to choose output 
and price combinations which do not maximize profits in the short run but which con-
tribute to long run objectives. Wiles, supra note 16, argues that uncertainty about de-
mand explains why firms with market power respond to increased costs with price in-
creases. See also A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 66-85. 
" E.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705. 
.. Depository Institutions Deregulators and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132. 
" Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 107 (prohibit-
ing exchanges from fixing commissions). 
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growth holds that there is a trade-off between full ·employment 
and inflation. 80 The primary focus of the supply-oriented analy-
ses is on the disruptive effects of market power on the interac-
tion of aggregate supply and demand. Thus, the implicit func-
tion of market power in demand analysis becomes explicit and 
central in supply analysis. 81 
A key aspect of the supply-side view is the empirical evidence 
that in times of recession, when employment and production are 
declining, prices of large firms either hold constant or increase." 
80 This trade-off, refened to as the Phillips Curve, purports to show how much infla-
tion is needed to generate any given reduction in unemployment. For a general discus-
sion of the literature and references, see Ross & Wachter, supra note 7, at 675-76. 
11 It is important to consider the factors which create market power in the economy. 
In terms of a corrective remedy, for example, it is necessary to know whether the pri-
mary source of market power is a collective exploitation of jointly held power by firms in 
highly concentrated industries or whether the source is individual firms, acting in a 
world 9f monopolistic competition, which are exploiting their market power'. See E. 
CHAMBERLIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (7th ed. 1954); see also Weiss, The Concentra· 
tion·Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw 
LEARNING 184, 185-93 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974). 
The distinction is potentially significant both for its legal implications and for its effi-
ciency implications. In terms of efficiency, collective market exploitation implies that the 
exploiters are probably viable as individual entities, while unilateral actions may imply 
the impossibility of a competitive remedy which does not produce significantly worse 
efficiency results or else fails to get to the core of the power of the firm. In Eichner's 
view, the market power of the large firm arises primarily from participation in collusive 
price setting. Eichner presents such behavior as the norm of large corporate conduct 
although he also demonstrates that similar results can be obtained in a monopoly con-
text. A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 40-41. 
Another question which deserves consideration is why this phenomenon has emerged 
only in the last two or three decades during which market power in traditional measures 
has been largely constant. See F. SCHERER, supra note 25, at 63. One suggestion would be 
that firms have learned only over time that their power is such that either individually or · 
collectively they can behave in this manner. An alternative, with some theoretical and 
empirical force, is that the increased conglomeratization of the economy has greatly facil-
itated a degree of inter- and intra-market behavioral coordination which is essential to 
effective exploitation of specific market power, whether individual or collective in origin. 
Edwards, Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 
331 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research ed. 1955); Mueller, Conglomerates: A "Nonindustry," 
in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 442 (5th ed. W. A~ams 1976); Solomon, Bank 
Merger, Policy and Problems: A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 2 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 325 (1970). 
u The original observations came from industrial organization economists, G. MEANs, 
PRICING POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1962); G. MEANS, STEEL PRICES AND ADMINIS· 
TERED INFLATION (1962); Blair, Market Power and Inflation: A Short-Run Target Return 
Model, 8 J. EcoN. ISSUES 453 (1974); Blair, Economic Concentration and Depression 
Price Rigidity, 45 AM. EcoN. REv. 566 (May 1955); Sherman, supra note 7; Qualls, Mar-
ket Structure and Price Behavior in U.S. Manufacturing 1967-72, 18 Q. R.Ev. EcoN. & 
Bus. No. 4, 35 (1978); Weiss, Business Pricing Policies and Inflation Reconsidered, 74 J. 
PoL. EcoN. 177 (1966). For a survey, see Mueller, supra note 7. Not surprisingly, con-
trary results have also been reported. See Lustgarten, Administered Inflation: A Reap-
praisal, 13· EcoN. INQUIRY 191 (1975); see also Weston & Lustgarten, Concentration and 
Wage-Price Change, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, 307 (H. 
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A major premise is that significant sectors of the economy are 
subject to the monopoly or oligopoly power of the firms domi-
nant in those sectors. Such firms have the ability to choose 
prices, individually or collectively, over a significant range of al-
ternatives. Choice of specific prices, especially continuously 
higher prices, results from a continuing battle within such indus-
tries among different groups for relative shares of real income.88 
Thus, as inflation occurs, labor, investors and management 
seek to protect their level of real income and to enhance it. The 
managers of a powerful business, having yielded greater money 
wages to labor and higher dividends to investors, then pass on 
that increment to the rest of the economy in the form of higher 
prices. Given power in the market, such firms have great discre-
tion to increase price to achieve previously decided levels of re-
turns regardless of the state of demand. Moreover, given a sub-
stantial and economically pivotal oligopoly sector, such price 
increases will work their way through the entire economy in the 
form of higher input costs and consequent output prices, and so 
provide the basis for further price increases by these powerful 
industries. 
Supply-oriented economists argue that it is feasible to limit 
the prices of firms in oligopolistic and monopolistic sectors of 
the economy and thereby obtain more output and employment 
given a fixed level of demand. Such regulation, however, is not 
useful for competitive industries because these sectors lack the 
excess capacity which could be used, if price is restricted, to gen-
erate greater supply.114 Given this analysis, inflation represents a 
continued dispute over relative income among participants in 
monopoly or oligopoly enterprises. Such firms adjust output and 
employment to expected demand at the price levels that they 
have chosen. 
1. Classical theory-Classical supply-oriented theory em-
ploys the traditional arguments and criteria as to the utility of 
market power. This theory holds that exploitation of market 
Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eda. 1974). 
•• See A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 144-68; Blair, Market Power and Inflation: A 
Short-Run Target Return Model, 8 J. EcoN. ISSUES 453 (1974); Ross & Wachter, supra 
note 7; Mueller, supra note 19; Peterson, Institutionalism, Keynes, and the Real World, 
11 J. ECON. ISSUES 201, 210 (1977) . 
.. R. LANZILLOTrI, M. HAMn.TON & R. ROBERTS, PHASE II IN REvmw: THE PRICE Cou-
MISSION EXPERIENCE (1975). Cf. Slawson, Price Controls for a Peacetime Economy, 84 
HARV. L. REv. 1090 (1971) (proposes tax on excess earnings of corporations which are 
neither in perfect competition nor in rapidly growing industries as a means to control 
supply push inflation. The implicit, key assumption is that the source of inflationary 
pressure is in concentrated, oligopoliatic industries). 
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power to create inflation and unemployment is undesirable. u 
Market power permits firms to refuse to supply demand when it 
exists or, from another perspective, to insist on higher prices 
than the costs of production would justify. Such firms thus de-
press the quantity of supply at any level of demand forcing 
prices up, and such prices then pass on as costs in competitive 
sectors of the economy. Powerful firms thus are able to disrupt 
the ordinary effect of fiscal and monetary policy. When demand 
is stimulated, these firms use their power to curtail supply or 
retard its expansion so that more income diverts to them. This 
causes employment to grow slowly while prices rise rapidly. 
When a slowdown occurs, those firms use their· power to hold 
price constant while reducing output (and employment). When 
investment objectives are not being met, they may even raise 
prices to capture a higher return on existing sales. 86 This ap-
proach views market power negatively. The more nearly compet-
itive a market can become, the more optimal its performance is 
likely to be. 
The policy recomendation which follows from this approach is 
that an incomes policy or wage-price control will often be neces-
sary. Such controls are manifestly second-best solutions to the 
problem of excess market power, but are the only solutions hav-
ing immediate effect. The longer run, pref erred solution is to re-
store more nearly workable competition in product markets.87 
2. The Eichner theory-A very different point of view exists, 
however, as to the social utility of the pattern of behavior pos-
ited in supply-oriented theory. One school of thought, associated 
with Professor Eichner, deems it socially vital.88 Eichner believes 
that large corporations have greater ability to plan over a longer 
run than competitive firms. He maintains that large firms have 
both the incentive and the capacity to engage in sustained intra-
16 Mueller, supra notes 7 and 19; Blair, supra note 32; Sherman, supra note 7; Feiwel, 
supra note 7, at 535; see also L. THURow, supra note 7, at 54-55; Mueller, supra note 20. 
Pollard, Antitrust and Price Stabilization Price Controls as a Short-Run Substitute for 
Structural Reform, I, II, 7 ANTrrauST L. & EcoN R.Ev. No. 3, 21; No. 4, 97 (1975). 
.. Support for this conclusion comes from a comparison of inflation, unemployment, 
· and output in the German and American economies. The comparison showed lower infla-
tion and greater output and employment in the German economy where the level of 
concentration in key sectors is substantially less than in the United States. Arndt, Com-
petition, Price and Wage Flexibility and Inflation: The German Experience, 17 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 859, 860-63 (1972). The author also suggests that the greater flexibility in 
wage rates, made possible by the character of German labor union contract practices, 
reduces the effective power of this aspect of the market, and has a significant impact on 
containing German inflation. But see L. THUROw, supra note 7, at 62-63 . 
.., Mueller, supra note 7. 
18 See generally A. EICHNER, supra note 7. 
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enterprise growth, unlike the competitive firm which can operate 
only one or two plants because of limited management capacity. 
According to Eichner, the large firm by use of its market power 
can more efficiently secure the necessary savings fund to pay for 
its growth. Moreover, large firms provide a stabilizing influence 
on macroeconomic phenomenon because their prices remain 
fixed for periods of time, even while their sales volume fluctu-
ates. This stabilizing effect stems from the firms' tendency to 
oversave relative to investment as the economy expands, and un-
dersave as it declines. 88 However, such firms are also likely to 
increase their corporation levies excessively and cause inflation, 
because the groups within such powerful firms strive for rela-
tively larger shares of the income which a firm may obtain. 
Nonetheless, Eichner argues, the power of these firms should be 
regulated rather than destroyed because the beneficial effects of 
their power are so desirable. 
For Eichner, an incomes policy is the appropriate form of reg-
ulation, requiring a conscious decision as to the relative entitle-
ments of labor, investors and managers to shares of the corpo-
rate levy. Eichner would also create a set of criteria to judge the 
social value of corporate investment. ' 0 A corporate management 
which failed to make socially useful investment would be subject 
to ouster by a government agency. Obviously, the actual deter-
mination of clear and effective criteria presents a formidable ob-
stacle to the adoption of such a scheme. 
Despite his slighting references to competition and antitrust,'1 
Eichner concedes that an economy could operate with effectively 
competitive businesses. Such an economy would, in his view, 
lack "the stabilizing role which megacorps play in the overall 
economy."0 Yet, Eichner does concede that the choice is be-
tween competition and market power, and that if market power 
is chosen, it must be regulated intensively.'8 
3. Policy implications-The supply-oriented analyses do not 
claim that supply alone is ever the only relevant factor in the 
macro-calculus. Indeed, in the classical pro-competition supply 
analysis, the effect of market power is to reduce the effect of 
demand manipulation. Similarly, in the Eichner model the regu-
lation of the use of market power is only a device to facilitate 
•• Id. at 189-223. 
•• Id. at 286-87; see also id. at 89-95. 
" Id. at 272. 
" Id. 
•• "[T]he largely unchecked power of the megacorp's executive group ... is ... a 
power which can work to the public's detriment .... " Id. at 287. 
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more effective government demand manipulations. 
In the pro-competitive view, the solution to problems of mar-
ket power on the supply side requires distinct short run and long 
run responses. In the short run, there should be effective wage 
and price controls applied to the primary, oligopoly industries 
which would limit the capacity of these industries to exploit 
their power to raise prices and thus frustrate the traditional 
instruments of macro policy.'' In the long run, the ultimate ob-
jective is competition, and the primary policy tool is rigorous an-
titrust enforcement aimed at destroying concentrations of power 
and restoring (or perhaps creating) more workable com-
petition. 46 
C. Growth Analysis 
The focus thus far has been on the short run problems of min-
imizing unemployment and inflation. Little direct, longer-run, 
consideration has been given to the third aspect of macro policy 
concern: economic growth. Implicitly, there are assumptions 
about growth in the models. In the Keynesian model, an infer-
ence is that growth follows and responds to demand. In the 
monetarist analysis, growth is a self-fulfilling aspect of a well or-
dered economic system. Of the supply-oriented theories, the 
traditional view considers competition the stimulus to growth in 
efficiency, and the lure of profit the device to induce and allocate 
added investment. The alternative theory on the supply side, 
the Eichner view, posits growth maximization as the primary 
goal of the large firm and prescribes direct control over that 
growth to achieve socially desirable results. 
There is another position on growth which holds that patent, 
antitrust and related laws affect the incentives to generate new 
products or even to improve efficiency of existing production. 
This predominately supply-oriented approach · suggests that 
given substantial demand, entrepreneurs will either forego in-
vestment, or direct it elsewhere if they lack sufficient incentive 
to invest in new plants or improved plants or new product re-
search and development. The existence of investment funds in 
some potentially socially desirable amount does not create the 
supply of investments. The users of those funds must have suffi-
cient property rights in the results of the effort to be rewarded 
•• See Mueller, supra note 19. 
•• Id. See also Blair, Market Power and Inflation: A Short-Run Target Return Model, 
8 J. ECON. ISSUES 453 (1974). 
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adequately for the risk taken.•8 The question remains as to what 
additional incentives, if any, will induce a change in the rate of 
growth. 
One view, the "stick" view, is that the strongest incentives to 
efficiency, new product development and growth come from the 
vigorous sting of the market. Professor Klein's analysis identifies 
the stultifying effect of oligopoly, conglomeratization and verti-
cal integration on the operation of competitive market un-
certainity as the key stimulus to growth. •7 Those industrial or-
ganization economists who stress the utility of increased 
competition as a means to control price increases and unemploy-
ment would reach a similar conclusion. •a The shift in focus is 
from the immediate and static effects of competition to a longer-
run, more dynamic view. Indeed, commentators perceive a sub-
stantial role for and relevance to competitive policy in the 
achievement of "progressiveness" in productive activity_.9 The 
implications of this view are that generally the right of a busi-
ness to exclude others from its activity should be narrowly con-
strued, and that reducing competitive pressures is either not 
likely to produce socially useful responses, or likely to do so only 
at excessive cost to society. ' 0 
The contrary view is that competition destroys the incentive 
to innovate and grow. Business needs "carrots" and not sticks. 
This approach finds expression in the current debates over pro-
tection of the steel and auto industries from competition. It also 
can lead at the extreme to demands that the antitrust laws be 
repealed. 111 
Significantly, the business community has over many genera-
tions claimed that competition is harmful.111 Repeatedly, this has 
•• Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. PA. & Paoc. 347 
(May 1967); North & Thomas, The First Economic Revolution, 30 EcoN. HIST. REv. 229 
(2d Ser. 1977). These theories revolve around a view that people act out of self interest 
and that inability to control the use of production creates risks of free riders. 
" B. KLEIN, supra note 7. 
•• Mueller, supra note 19; F. SCHERER, supra note 25; Markham, Concentration: A 
Stimulus or Retardant to Innovation, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARN-
ING, 247 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974). 
•• See C. KAvsEN & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST Poucv 12 (1959). 
00 Even those opposed to antitrust see this risk. See L.Tuuaow, supra note 7. 
•• Id. at 146-50. See also Thurow, Let's Abolish the Antitrust Laws, N. Y. Times, Oct. 
19, 1980, § 3 at 2, col. 3 . 
.. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); 
' United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
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been a false alarm. 113 Moreover, there is implicit in the claims, as 
they relate to growth, the argument that businesses should both 
produce and innovate.114 Yet, no necessity commands that the 
firms which produce products must also innovate them. Many 
commentators suggest that some or all research and develop-
ment activity be centralized which implies a separation from the 
productive enterprise.1111 
Agriculture is an excellent example of the "stick" model of 
growth.118 Its key features would appear to be reliance upon non-
producer, largely publicly-funded research and development, 
and a vigorously competitive market in basic output terms. In 
addition government has been willing via subsidy and loan pro-
grams to ameliorate the harshest results of market conse-
quences.117 This market intervention has arguably produced ex-
cessive consumer costs compared to the benefits conferred. 118 
Agriculture has long separated primary research and develop-
ment activity from productive enterprise. This separation sug-
gests that it is error to assume that all functions traditionally 
performed by businesses should be continued. Notably, the agri-
cultural sector has remained largely non-conglomeratized, verti-
cally disintegrated and financed by outside capital sources. : 
•• The experience of the 193O's is an example. The failure of the National Recovery 
Act and its cartel approach led the government to embrace a policy of active promotion 
of competition. E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966); A. 
SCHLESSINGER, THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1960) . 
.. B. KLEIN, supra note 7; Dasgupts & Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and 
the Speed of R & D, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 1 (1980). 
68 L. THUROW, supra note 7, at 92-95; A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 284-85 . 
.. Agriculture is the segment of the economy which has had the greatest sustsined 
growth in productivity over more than a century. It is also the one sector of the economy 
most nearly perfectly competitive. Agricultural research and development has occurred 
largely in public institutions (L. THUROW, supra note 7, at 95) or in sources of supply 
and then been disseminated rapidly because farmers had to be efficient to survive. This 
need drove them to adopt new and more productive techniques as soon as those tech-
niques were available. Despite decades of demand for more income, farmers have raised 
the needed capital to make necessary investments in farms. 
•• See Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608 et seq. (1976 & Supp. II 1978) 
(crop supports); see Agricultural Credit Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1921 et seq. (1976 & Supp. II 
1978) (agricultural credit). 
68 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (resale price control on milk upheld as 
potentially aiding farmer producer); see Ippolito & Masson, The Social Cost of Govern-
ment Regulation of Milk, 21 J. L. & EcoN. 33 (1978). 
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II. MARKET POWER AND COMPETITION: THE CHOICE BETWEEN 
REGULATING AND DISSIPATING MARKET POWER 
A. Macroeconomic Policy Objectives 
The conflicting macroeconomic theories have a set of consis-
tent objectives and a common concern. Identification of those 
objectives and that concern will permit an evaluation of the 
choice between competition and other regulation as a means of 
managing market power. Where competition is the chosen ap-
proach, appropriate policy directions can be prescribed. 
The overall objectives common to all the theories of economic 
policy are efficiency in production and distribution, progressive-
ness in the development of new products and new production 
techniques, stability in terms of employment and prices, and 
some reasonable equity in the distribution of goods and services 
among the population. 119 Relative emphasis may vary among 
these objectives, but all are central to a comprehensive economic 
policy. 
Moreover, under any theory, unchecked market power creates 
the risk that these objectives will not be achieved. This suggests 
that every macroeconomic theory must deal with market power. 
The fundamental choice is between acceptance of power com-
bined, perhaps, with regulation thereof, and a rejection of power 
as socially desirable with a consequent policy of limiting or elim-
inating it. 
B. The Case for Dissipation of Market Power 
In evaluating the contending choices of maximized competi-
tion against regulated power, one should not only consider the 
current economic situation but also the political environment. 
Within this framework, market power can be viewed either as a 
necessity for macro policy reasons or as an inevitable by-product 
of our economic system. 
1. The Eichner analysis-Eichner asserts that market power 
is both inevitably and desirably a part of macro-economic 
events. Eichner favors large, management controlled enterprises 
because by virtue of the skills ·and interests of their managers, 
they are able and willing to plan in longer time perspectives 
•• C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, supra note 49, at 11-14. 
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than classically imagined owner-operators appear likely to do. 
They are also, for the same managerial reason, more able to op-
erate multiple facilities and to add to such multiplicity without 
adverse managerial effect. Neither of these capabilities require 
market power. Hence, even assuming that manager-controlled 
firms made more efficient investment decisions, there is no need 
for them to have market power. Even Eichner's argument that 
large firm conduct acts in a counter-cyclical way, cooling periods 
of excess growth in demand and stimulating demand when it 
lags, relates to the planning and time perspective of such firms 
and not their market power. Moreover, other actors, e.g., pen-
sion funds, have long-run savings needs and would or could have 
counter-cyclical flows of funds as compared to investments, and 
so could perform a similar stabilizing function.80 Eichner's own 
analysis suggests that overt control of the internal investment 
decisions of firms is necessary to exert a counter-cyclical force.81 
2. The corporate levy problem-It is important to consider 
whether the power to employ the corporate levy itself is socially 
desirable. Eichner's claim that megacorps are better deci-
sionmakers than the market is unjustified by either systematic 
examinations of such corporations generally or by specific exam-
ples of such investment decisions. 81 Those in control of powerful 
corporations act as much to enhance their own position or pres-
tige as they do to maximize some mythical corporate return. 83 
From the perspective then of stimulating dynamic growth and 
innovation, Professor Klein's argument that it is the spur of the 
competitive stick which the manager needs and not the pacify-
80 Pension plans, which are increasingly significant sources of economic wealth, see A. 
BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959); P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How 
PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA (1976), would indeed seem to have exactly 
the same long run investment incentives as Eichner's megacorp managers. Such funds 
might be preferable vehicles for investments because they could have greater latitude to 
invest in many varied projects without having to take on managerial responsibility and 
because they may be able to act to force managers to achieve greater productive effi-
ciency. See Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 AM. EcoN. REV. 392 
(1966); see also A. BERLE, supra. Thus pension fund managers may provide a nongovern-
mental policing function on investment decisions which could at least partially obviate 
the need for government regulation. 
11 A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 89-95; see also C. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 
78-85, 149.55 (1977) . 
.. C. LINDBLOOM, supra note 61, at 149-55; P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, 
POLICIES (1975); Carstensen & Questal, The Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 848-49 
(1978); Weiner, Ward's Future with Mobil is Questioned as Retailer Prepares to Post a 
Large Loss, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1980, at 4, col. 2. 
•• See, e.g., Kraar, General Electric's Very Personal Merger, FORTUNE, 187-294 (Aug. 
1977). 
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ing quality of the oligopolistic carrot, is the more persuasive. 
To the extent that savings itself is inadequate in the economy 
to provide for the desired level of growth, the corporate levy is 
clearly not the only alternative. The problem may well be insti-
tutional, and solutions may well require restructured tax or 
other incentives to individual or group savings. The emergence 
of the pension funds now subject to regulation requiring ade,. 
quate funding6 ' may provide an alternative means to generate 
needed levels of savings. If, in fact, the corporate levy were re-
duced, individual and group savings would be made more feasi-
ble. Or as yet another alternative, the government could explic-
itly tax sales to generate needed savings. 66 
3. The economic performance dimension-Assuming that 
roughly similar macro results can fl.ow from regulated market 
power and from a more competitive market, there are practical 
considerations weighing against regulated power. Regulation of 
market power is very difficult to accomplish.86 Indeed, regulation 
of market power to the extent necessary to have a substantial 
effect on the market is likely to stifle the growth of the econ-
omy.67 The presence of such power has necessitated much of the 
current regulation of safety and other aspects of corporate con-
duct. 66 This approach does not commend itself as a preferable 
64 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 
codified, in part, as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Sections 
1101-14 provide for comprehensive federal regulation of the funding of pension plans. 
" A direct government tax has several advantages. Such a device could set rates based 
on the likely social costs of asking various groups to save. Under a corporate levy, the 
rate of "tax" depends on the relative elasticity of demand and barriers to entry as well as 
the need for investable funds. For example, oligopoly drug makers are able to tax the 
savings of the sick to generate investment funds for their corporate activities. More con-
scious social planning of the tax incidence would seem desirable. Likewise, as a govern-
ment tax, the proceeds could.be directed to socially desirable investment decisionmakers. 
This would require some assignment device, but that is clearly within the capacity of 
legislatures. 
"" This is true in the narrow public utility context, R. ScHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF 
NATURAL MONOPOLIES (1979); Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 548 (1969), and even more true in trying to regulate the economy as a whole. Jones, 
Government Price Controls and lnff,ation: A Prognosis Based on the Impact of Controls 
in the Regulated Industries, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 303 (1980). The participants in the 
wage-price controls of the earlier 1970's, while finding some merit in those controls as 
short-term measures, describe the great problems of making any set of regulations opera-
tional and point to the intense difficulty of continually adjusting to new and changing 
events on both the supply and demand side. LANZILLOTTI, HAMILTON & ROBERTS, supra 
note 34. See also A. WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABn.JTY: THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE OF 
1971 (1973). 
" B. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 216-21. 
98 The exploration of the interaction of market power, the failure of traditional legal 
institutions to provide relevant and effective signals to businesses, and the use of new 
directly regulatory controls to re-establish desired performance are additional factors to 
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social alternative. 
Even if macro functions could be carried out without market 
power, it may be that market power is either necessary as an 
element of microeconomic life or an inevitable concomitant of it. 
Galbraith, arguing the first position, advances the idea that in 
order to exist, modern firms need the capacity to control de-
mand, i.e., market power, to insure a place for their products.89 
Other observers suggest that firms can merely respond to de-
mand and still survive. 70 Galbraith's argument, viewed in longer 
and more dynamic terms, seems even more questionable because 
of the greater uncertainty which any producer confronts.71 
Some have advanced the second position that observed power 
in the market is always a product of the superior efficiency of 
those producers who possess it.7s Eichner's analysis of invest-
ment alternatives shows the weakness with this position. 78 
One observer, Professor Markovits, argues that much of the 
market power of firms arises from locational and relational ad-
vantages that each firm has with respect to some or all of its 
customers.74 This view of economic reality, which takes account 
of both spatial phenomenon and the costliness of transactions, 
suggests that at least some power is inevitable. But because the 
power which Markovits identifies is a consequence of inter-en-
terprise economic organization, its dissipation only eliminates 
sub-optimal aspects of the way the economy operates and does 
not affect the productive efficiency of the firm. 
Thus, the position that market power is either a necessary or 
consider. The mandating of specific auto safety and efficiency standards may reflect the 
failure of both the market (because of the lack of competition among automakers) and 
the traditional legal sanctions (e.g., product liability) to induce socially desirable behav-
ior. The choice between regulation and restoration of a more effective market context in 
order to achieve desired performance has apparently been overlooked by decision mak-
ers. As a consequence, the regulatory environment makes effective competition by small 
car manufacturers even more difficult, and makes safety and efficiency into subjects of 
political negotiation rather than market imperatives. See B. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 216-
21; C. LINDBLOOM, supra note 61, at 149-55. 
•• See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). 
•
0 See B. KLE1N, supra note 7, at 133-35; C. LINDBLOOM, supra note 61, at 38-40, 216-
17; cf., A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 117-20. 
71 See B. KLEIN, supra note 7, 134-35. 
,. See J. McGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (1971); Demsetz, supra 
note 21. 
•• A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 90-96; see also C. LINDBLOOM, supra note 61, at 149-55; 
B. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 73-78. · 
,. See, e.g., Markovits, Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in a 
Monopolistically Competitive World: A Non-Market-Oriented Proposal and Critique of 
the Market Definition-Market Share-Market Concentration Approach, 56 TEXAS L. 
Rsv. 587 (1978). 
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inevitable aspect of microeconomic activity is unconvincing. 
Moreover, there are strong non-economic reasons against al-
lowing such power to exist absent a compelling showing. The so-
cial-political concerns over power in any aggregated form are 
deep and strongly justified.711 These non-economic concerns sug-
gest a policy of dissipating market power. 
C. Regulation of Market Power as an Alternative to 
Dissipation 
The reasoning to this point suggests that effectively competi-
tive markets are preferable to regulated, oligopolistic or monop-
olistic markets. It does not follow that all markets can be made 
effectively competitive at acceptable costs in terms of efficiency 
and enforcement. 78 It should also be emphasized that antitrust 
law is not the exclusive instrument for the control of market 
power.77 Much work remains to be done in connection with lim-
iting or eliminating market power created by laws which author-
ize such power in private industry. 
Market power can also exist because poorly organized markets 
fail to provide consumers with adequate information or relevant 
choices.78 Agencies regulating such markets can cause relevant 
disclosures thus reducing power and inefficiency in the market.711 
Alternatively, the legal system may intervene using either anti-
trust or constitutional mandates to bar anticompetitive market 
behavior. 80 More radical restructuring may occasionally be es-
70 One commentator has stated this concern in broad social terms: 
It has been a curious feature of democratic thought that it has not faced up to 
the private corporation as a peculiar organization in an ostensible democracy. 
Enormously large, rich in resources, the big corporations, we have seen, com-
mand more resources than do most government units. . . . They are on all these 
counts disproportionately powerful, we have seen. The large private corporation 
fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit. 
C. LINDBLOOM, supra note 61, at 356. See also Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the 
Antitrust Laws, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 555 (1973); Carstensen & Questa!, supra note 62, at 
863-66. 
•• See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 7-16 (1976). 
77 Some commentators do argue, correctly, that law is the most effective creator and• 
protector of market power. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 21. 
•• See Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1979) 
•• Such market perfecting regulation is quite different in character from specific per-
formance regulation. Its objective is not to control specific decisions but rather to create 
an environment in which consumers can make effective choices based on relevant infor-
mation. The compulsory automobile fuel efficiency disclosure, and cigarette tar and nico-
tine content disclosures, are but two examples of efforts via regulation to perfect the 
market rather than replace it. 
•• See California Retail Liquor Dlrs. Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 
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sential, as in health care, to create a market context in which 
buyers organized to seek cost-effective care can come together 
with sellers able to compete on that basis.81 
To the extent that power cannot be effectively limited, there 
is a sound basis for regulating its use. However, the gains from 
such regulation may be more than offset by the debilitating ef-
fect of such regulation on innovation and independence. 82 De-
spite these concerns, once there is a recognition that powerful 
entities can wreak havoc on macroeconomic policy through their 
independent decisions, it is unlikely that political intervention 
in such decisions can be avoided. This in turn suggests another 
reason to pref er an unregulated economy: the dynamic potential 
of individual economic actors will be less constrained in such an 
environment, thus keeping free the capacity for innovation and 
development of new markets which is essential to sustained eco-
nomic growth. 
These reasons cumulatively suggest a preference for the crea-
tion and maintenance of effectively competitive markets. The 
policy preference is relevant to longer-run policy because such 
competitive markets may not be possible in the short run. In the 
short run, given substantial, existing power, it would be desira-
ble to have available effective, efficient regulatory controls to re-
strain the socially unproductive use of such power. Such short-
term regulation, whether via wage and price guidelines or more 
formal control, would also provide a context in which to refine 
and test the regulatory alternative to competition. 
III. THE ROLE OF ANTrrRusT POLICY IN THE MACROECONOMY 
This section identifies the ways in which antitrust policy and 
enforcement efforts should be directed in light of the conclusion 
that macroeconomic policy should both minimize existing mar-
ket power and keep new power from developing. 88 
The broad outlines of the desirable antitrust enforcement pol-
icy are evident. First, the enforcement agencies need to locate 
the firms which possess or potentially can possess substantial 
market power which can affect significant economic sectors. Sec-
(1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 
U.S. 579 (1976); Virginia State Bd. of Phann. v. Virginia Cits. Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
11 L. THURoW, supra note 7, at 69 . 
.,, See B. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 213-21. See also note 68 supra . 
.,, See Part II C supra. 
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ond, remedies must be developed which can effectively eliminate 
existing power and frustrate efforts to convert potential into ac-
tual power. Third, in order to achieve these remedies, some legal 
doctrines will have to be reworked or elaborated to the extent 
that they currently make ineffective the enforcement program 
prescribed in the first two steps. Fourth, the enforcement agen-
cies will have to have the resources, will, and direction to pursue 
a consistent program to eliminate market power. 
A. Standards for Determining Market Power 
Policymakers need a far better idea of the location and causes 
of market power now that such power has been linked to the 
macroeconomic process. The usual static analysis of 
microeconomics assumes the existence of power (monopoly) or 
its absence (competition) but does not explain how that power 
arises. 84 The intensity and duration of such power also needs 
fuller exploration. Power may arise and be maintained because 
of the productive efficiency of a few firms out of a group of com-
petitors. 811 It may arise because of the locational or transactional 
advantage that sellers have with respect to individual custom-
ers. 88 The most common explanation is that it comes from inter-
dependent decisions about price and output made by a group of 
dominant firms within each industry.87 The aggregate structure 
<?f industry, i.e., its degree of conglomeratization, may also 
greatly affect the degree of power firms possess as well as their 
inclination to use that power in specific contexts.88 
To the extent that market power results from efficiency, legal 
or politico-economic conditions can be adjusted to permit other 
firms in the industry to achieve equal efficiency. The other theo-
ries of power do not imply that eliminating such power sources 
will affect the efficiency of the firms involved. Investigation. of 
individual industries using rough measures .of power and signifi-
cance could yield substantial insight into the sources of power in 
any specific firm or industry. 
14 See Demsetz, supra note 21, at 166-67. 
80 Demsetz, supra note 21, at 166; McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUS· 
TRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 55 (H. Goldschmid, G. Mann & J. Weston 
eds. 1974); but see F. SCHERER ET AL, THE EcoNOMICS or MULTI-PLANT OPERATION (1975) . 
.. See Markovits, supra note 74. 
17 A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 38-45 • 
.. See id. at 117-26; Mueller, Conglomerates: A "Nonindustry," in THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 442 (5th ed., N. Adams 1976); Solomon, Bank Merger Policy and 
Problems: A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 2 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 325 (1970). 
0 
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B. Remedial Measures for Market Power 
The choice of remedy is critical in dealing with market power. 
Remedies are either structural or conduct-directed in character. 
1. Conduct-oriented remedies-Conduct-oriented remedies 
in turn either define permissible zones of conduct or impose a 
regulatory environment. If a conduct-oriented antitrust remedy 
takes the latter course, it implies the correctness of the claim 
that power is inevitable and must be directly regulated. If, how-
ever, by specific guidelines, collective power can be kept latent, 
and competitive conduct put in its place, then the effect of the 
conduct-oriented remedy is to restrict the capacity of latent 
power to have effect. 89 Such remedies· are highly desirable. 
A greater restriction on the ability of firms in concentrated 
industries to establish list prices and to announce changes sub-
stantially in advance of their implementation or otherwise signal 
to each other would force upon such firms more uncertainty, re-
tard their interest in price increases, and stimulate more com-
petitive conduct generally. A systematic enforcement program 
could seek to eliminate as many as possible of the facilitating 
devices which appear to be crucial factors in the effective crea-
tion and maintenance of shared market power. Such remedies 
could significantly reduce the capacity of firms to employ collu-
sive or interdependent conduct. 
An examination of restricted distribution schemes by powerful 
firms might show that their primary contribution is not effi-
ciency, but enhanced control over the economic environment, 
making it easier to obtain and retain power.90 Solutions would 
then include elimination of territorial and customer restrictions 
on resale, and prohibition of those devices which effectively im-
pose exclusive purchasing requirements on the dealer. Recent 
experience in the oil industry is suggestive that more dealer free-
dom in obtaining supplies is likely to stimulate substantially 
•• See United States v. General Electric Co. and Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1977-2 
TRADE CAs. 11 61,659 and United States v. General Electric Co. 1977-2 TRADE CAS. 11 
61,660 (modifying consent decree to prohibit price signaling); see also Ethyl Corp., FTC 
Dkt. 9128 (charging a restraint of trade via various signaling devices). See generally 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM ON SHARED MONOPOLIES, May 26, 1978, reprinted in 
[1978) 874 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1. 
00 See Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to 
Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); Schmitt, Antitrust and Distribution Problems in 
Tight Oligopolies-A Case Study of the Automobile Industry, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 849 
(1973). See also Carstensen, Vertical Restraints and the Schwinn Doctrine: Rules for 
the Creation and Dissipation of Economic Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 771 (1976). 
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greater price competition.e1 
Where the use of locational or relational power has not pro-
duced explicit, restrictive agreement, the problem of remedy is 
even greater. Case-specific analysis could show the extent to 
which limits on conduct can affect the degree of exploitation of 
such power. Potentially useful might be requirements that pro-
ducers sell f.o.b. to any financially able buyer or that the power 
to refuse to sell, once some sales had been made, could be exer-
cised only for good cause. Defining appropriate remedies for 
such transactional and locational power is a difficult task be-
cause of the problem of insuring efficient distribution while 
eliminating power-creating restraints without creating new 
sources of power. 
2. Structural remedies-If conduct-oriented remedies fail to 
keep potential power latent and inactive, an alternative remedy 
may be necessary. Where signaling and comparable stabilizing 
devices cannot be removed, or where their removal does not suf-
ficiently disrupt shared market responses, one solution is to re-
quire dissolution.92 
The shape of such dissolution would have to consider loca-
tional or relational power so that the resulting structure would 
minimize that source of power as wen.es Once firms' power is 
neither necessary nor a necessary by-product of efficiency, there 
should be no theoretical objection to reorganizing an industry to 
eliminate such power." Practical problems of implementing such 
remedies are more convincing objections.ea One of the most seri-
ous obstacles is that the courts and enforcement agencies are re-
luctant to require a structural remedy. However, courts should 
not lose sight of the relative ease of implementing such struc-
tural changes. For example, the investment banking community 
is in fact as adept at subdividing businesses as it is at combining 
them. The problem is to bring such resources to bear on the 
problem. 
Even if it appears that market power is largely associated with 
past efficiency on the part of a small group of firms in an indus-
try, a structural remedy, if appropriate, should be considered. 
91 The existence of occasional "gas wars" attests to this proposition . 
.. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 
1562 (1969). 
•• Markovits, supra note 74. 
84 See S. 3832, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); see also REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK 
FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICIES (1968). 
•• Posner, Problems of a Policy of Deconcentration, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: 
THE NEW LEARNING 393 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974). 
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Such a remedy would be especially appropriate where some or 
all of the firms are operating on a substantially decentralized ba-
sis. 98 Although it is important to determine whether any com-
mon features of the enterprise will be disrupted, the likelihood 
of any serious adverse effect is not appreciable in cases where 
the industry is already decentralized. 
Mergers, whether horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate,117 can 
both enhance market power and create added inducements to its 
exploitation. 98 Merger is, however, very rarely the only solution 
to any real economic problem confronting the participants. A 
stern policy of opposition to all significant mergers is a long-run 
guarantor of a.n economy of increasing numbers of actors and 
thus minimized market power.99 
C. The Antitrust Law Framework 
The proposition that the enforcement of the antitrust laws 
can have a positive impact on macroeconomic phenomenon in 
the long run does not require a shift in antitrust enforcement 
from its focus on the promotion of competition. Rather, in main-
taining this focus, effective antitrust enforcement will help to 
create an economic environment in which the traditional 
macroeconomic policy tools can be effectively employed. Accord-
ingly, no major changes in existing legal doctrine are essential. 
" Very large firms in general are obliged to copy the market internally in order to 
achieve efficiency. E. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1959); see also 
0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 132-
75 (1975). 
" There is much debate about the economic impact of conglomerate mergers. See P. 
STEINER, supra note 62. There is a substantial body of evidence that argues that such 
mergers are unlikely to produce efficiency or other socially desirable economic advan-
tages; but there is also substantial evidence that such mergers do not in themselves alter 
market power. See id.; see also Carstensen & Questal, supra note 62, at 842-49. Professor 
Eichner argues, however, that the effect of conglomeratization is to change the incentives 
to engage in oligopolistic market exploitation in specific markets because of both the 
greater skill of the conglomerate at market exploitation and its interest in taxing one 
market to finance activity in another. A. EICHNER, supra note 7, at 117-26. From a pro-
competitive perspective, Eichner cautions that conglomerate firms may behave more 
anti-competitively in specific markets and fail.to make investments in such markets be-
cause of the alternatives which they perceive. In other contexts, economists have shown 
the inefficiency of such conduct. See Burnstein, A Theory of Full Line Forcing, 55 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 61 (1960); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analy-
sis and Public Policy Standards, 30 L. & CoNTBMP. PROBS. 506 (1965). 
08 R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw AND EcoNOMICS (1976) (horizontal mergers produce risks 
of market power); F. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS (1978). 
" See Mueller, supra note 88; Pertschuk & Davidson, What's Wrong with Conglomer-
ate Mergers, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1979); see also Carstensen & Questal, supra note 62. 
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Imperative, however, is an expansion of judicial awareness of the 
social and economic reasons for objecting to the creation and re-
tention of effective market power, and second, some refinement 
and elaboration of doctrine to insure that effective remedy is not 
frustrated. 
1. Mergers-Current law against substantial mergers is fully 
effective to support challenges to significant horizontal and ver-
tical mergers.100 Its most serious weakness is in handling poten-
tial competition and conglomerate merger. The problem is not 
the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to employ presumptive 
standards, but the unwillingness of judges to perceive risks to 
economic values in such combinations.101 
Judicial recognition of the effect of such mergers, including an 
awareness of aspects of such combinations discussed above, 
should lead the courts to bar such mergers. The appropriate 
doctrinal response is to create a presumption of illegality against 
all large mergers, and to exempt therefrom only those for which 
positive proof of offsetting desirable effects is tendered. 102 
2. Oligopolistic industries-To the extent that the source of 
power is interdependent oligopoly activity, Interstate Circuit 
and the basepoint pricing decisions108 establish that such behav-
ior will constitute collusive conduct under the Sherman Act.104 
100 Merger law, at the doctrinal level, operates from a presumption of illegality which 
arises whenever substantial market shares are involved. United States v. Continental 
Can Corp., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 
321, 363 (1963). Even the recent doctrinal exceptions have been fitted closely to this 
framework. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United 
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974). 
In the hands of lower courts, the results are sometimes less logical. See, e.g., United 
States v. International Harvester, 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977). This in tum counsels the 
need for a re-emphasis upon the structural and presumptive character of merger 
analysis. 
101 Yet Professor Eichner, for example, identifies the conglomerate organization as one 
with the strongest interest in and the greatest potential to create market power, see 
EICHNER, supra note 7; Professor Klein analyzes the conglomerate as having a debilitat-
ing effect on the dynamics of the market, see B. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 41; while Profes-
sor Steiner and many others find the conglomerate unlikely to produce significant econo-
mies or efficiencies not otherwise achievable. P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, 
POLICIES 205-08, 323 (1975). 
10
• For proposals along these lines which are not based on the macroeconomic concerns 
raised here, see Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act: Today's Law and Tomorrow's Legislation, 58 BosTON U. L. REV. 199 (1978); 
Blake, supra note 75; Broadley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 
87 YALE L.J. 1 (1977); Carstensen & Questa!, supra note 62; Pertschuk & Davidson, 
supra note 99. 
10
• See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); FTC v. Cement 
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). 
104 Contemporary use of this doctrine includes: Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 
434 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
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The outer boundary of demonstrable interdependent behavior is 
set only by the existence of an effective remedy.1011 Again, the 
doctrinal implication is that the courts must be clear that when-
ever behavior is interdependent it is, by definition, collusive and, 
so long as it is remediable, it is also unlawfully collusive. 
The primary areas for legal development are in the articula-
tion of intelligible standards for testing the reasonableness of 
those restraints subject to the rule of reason.106 Current deci-
sions do not provide such guidance. 107 Starting from the premise 
that any restraint of trade arises from a belief on the part of the 
parties that one or both could gain an advantage there-
from-which in turn implies that one or both probably possess 
some market power108-to uphold any restraint as reasonable is 
to allow a clog on the free market. Such clogs may be use-
ful-even essential-but courts must recognize their inherent 
anticompetitive effect and fashion an analysis which limits the 
right to restrain trade to only those situations where such re-
straint is socially useful. 109 
As a practical enforcement matter, clarifying the analysis to 
be used in testing the reasonableness of a restraint, especially if 
it restricts such justification to demonstrably ancillary re-
straints, will facilitate and substantially encourage investment of 
enforcement resources in this area. 
A second doctrinal innovation is where the conduct of firms is 
collusive in character, but no purely conduct-oriented decree is 
likely to be effective. In such cases, appropriate relief should in-
clude dissolution and restructuring of the firm or firms in-
••• See Turner, Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallel-
ism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962); see also DEPT. OF JUSTICE MEMO, 
.supra note 89. · 
108 This is a common complaint of all commentators. Bohling, Simplified Rule of Rea-
son for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 
64 IOWA L. REv. 461 (1979); Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, in THE Su-
PREME COURT REVIEW 171 (P. Kurland & G. Gasper eds. 1978); Pitofsky, The Sylvania 
Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978); 
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reftections on the Sylvania 
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977); see also Carstensen, Annual Survey of Antitrust 
Developments: 1976-1977, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 3-35 (1978). 
107 See, e.g., Cantalano v. Target Sales, - U.S. - , 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980); California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 
(1977). 
108 Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 825 (1955); see also McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American 
Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 191, 197-204 (1960). 
'
09 See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per" Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965). 
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volved. no Such a remedy requires that the evidence show that 
the restructured firm be viable. If restructuring is viable, there 
should be little ,reluctance to remedying bad conduct by altering 
the structure that made it possible. 111 
3. Single firm market power-Individual firm power 
presents a significant legal problem. Many firms have significant 
market power based on locational or relational advantages. The 
remedy for such power will frequently require jurisdiction over 
firms acting unilaterally, although in the case of restrictive dis-
tribution arrangements, collusion would exist. The jurisdictional 
mandate is section 2 of the Sherman Act, which outlaws monop-
oly, but such firms may not fit the traditional definition of a 
monopolist. Such firms may appear to be merely parts of a large 
industry, and thus to lack the market share traditionally associ-
ated with a monopolist in spite of the kind of power they wield. 
Nevertheless, assuming the existence of a remedy, we can say 
that such a firm possesses more power than is necessary to its 
existence, and that its power is socially harmful. An expanded 
definition of monopoly would help courts to examine the con-
duct of powerful firms and ascertain if that power could be re-
duced without adverse efficiency effects. 
A redefinition of monopoly would not necessarily involve a 
"no fault" monopoly standard, since it is entirely consistent with 
this suggestion that the prosecutor show actual use of market 
,power in wrongful ways. The concept of wrongfulness would 
have to expand to embrace the kind of inflexible-price, flexible 
output-and-employment conduct which is the core of the 
macroeconomic objection to monopoly. 
Potential problems do, however, exist with an expanded defi-
nition of the meaning of a single firm monopoly. mi It might cre-
ate undesirable insecurity among managers of leading firms. It 
is, however, also possible that to the extent that the trigger for a 
challenge was actual abuse of position as revealed in price in-
creases above some norm, the effect might be to induce firms 
which feared potential liability to try to limit price increases by 
emphasizing cost control. Such a shift in internal incentives is 
generally recognized to be the most desirable and effective way 
110 Posner, supra note 92, at 1591. Posner, however, no longer supports this position. 
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). 
111 The general doctrine on remedy is that any remedy may be prescribed even if it 
goes beyond the contours of the offense charged so long as its intended effect is restora-
tion of a competitive market. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
"" See Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the 
Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373 (1974). 
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to control market power misuse. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
reducing market power requires challenges to single firm power, 
the present legal doctrines are not well structured to do the job. 
An alternative to dealing with the legal issues discussed here 
is to adopt additional, specific legislation aimed at authorizing 
both conduct and structural remedies aimed at dissipating mar-
ket power. Some proposals in both the merger and oligopoly 
structure area have been made. 113 No fault monopoly rules have 
also been suggested. m It suffices to say that specific legislative 
endorsement of useful remedies is helpful, but the effectiveness 
of such remedies is of primary concern. 
D. Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws 
It is not enough merely to prescribe investigation of power 
and remedy, and to revise legal doctrine. It is vital that a sys-
tematic program of enforcement exist. Such a program requires 
increased resources for enforcement, a clear policy directing the 
use of those resources at targets relevant to the macro objectives 
being sought, a willingness to act on the part of those charged 
with overseeing this effort, and sufficient political support for 
the program. 
1. Resources and policy focus-Although resources for the 
FTC and Department of Justice have grown in recent years, any 
effort to try to have a noticeable impact on market power would 
require a quantum leap in the aggregate enforcement resources. 
Some of that increment might come through contracting investi-
gations and cases to outside lawyers and economists. The United 
States Attorneys' offices can also play a role in a program which 
has formulated a clear list of objectives. The greatest need is 
that there be sufficient, competent legal and economic personnel 
to make the threat of action creditable. If the likelihood of anti-
trust action is high, settlement will be the likely result in many 
cases. 
The second need is for a clear policy direction that will insure 
that the available resources are directed at targets which merit 
such investments. Efforts should be directed at significant sec-
tors of the economy where the macro effects are likely to be sub-
m See S. 600, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Kennedy conglomerate merger bill); see 
also note 94 supra. 
'" NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE R.Bvmw OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1979). 
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stantial. Even overt price fixing of wooden toilet seats1111 or Ko-
rean wigs116 ought not receive significant staff effort, yet too 
often antitrust aims at such targets of opportunity. 
2. Political commitment-For enforcement to work there 
must be sufficient political support. No law enforcement pro-
gram operates in a vacuum. When a program takes on powerful 
forces in society, moreover, it must have powerful support or its 
resources will be removed and its activities disrupted. 
Although antitrust law has existed for nearly a century, major 
enforcement began barely four decades ago, and, because of 
World War II, was not a sustained program until the late 1940's. 
In those three decades, the antitrust laws have suffered from 
shifting judicial interpretations and uneven commitment from 
those charged with enforcement. The history of antitrust is 
therefore, not that of inherent failure, but rather of a relatively 
recent beginning followed by a less than total commitment. 
The lack of commitment to antitrust enforcement might be 
viewed as evidence that such a program to tame corporate power 
can never achieve its objective despite its micro- and 
macroeconomic desirability. Some believe that the deck is 
stacked heavily against any effort to challenge corporate power. 
The strength of corporate political power may be exaggerated. In 
any event, if corporate power is capable of frustrating antitrust 
law, it may also frustrate any other effective regulatory program. 
There are risks that corporations could come to control a contin-
uing regulatory process and use it for their advantage.117 This 
suggests that while both regulation and antitrust may be frus-
trated by effective corporate power the risks are greater that the 
regulatory approach can be both frustrated and subverted. 
Viewed solely as a political issue, antitrust, arguably, has more 
political strength than regulation. An antitrust challenge to mar-
ket power comports with long standing and deeply felt political 
views in this country.118 Moreover, such a challenge is basically .a 
defense of the free and open market, ultimately unregulated, 
which is ideologically attractive in this country. In attacking this 
110 United States v. Beatrice Foods, 1977-2 'l'RADE CAS. 11 61,739, (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
See also United States v. Florida Portable Sanitation Ass'n, No. 77-136-CR-SMA (S.D. 
Fla., filed March 16, 1977). 
110 United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass'n of America, 1976-1 TRADE CAs. 11 60,773 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
117 See B. KLEIN, supra note 7, at 214-21; Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. 
EcoN. 22 (1971). 
118 See, e.g., Jackson's veto message on the second bank of the United States, 2 COMPI-
LATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THB PRBsmBNTS 1789-1897 576 (J. Richardson ed. 
1896). . 
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· challenge, business has a difficult political message: it wishes 
freedom from the policemen of the market place. Antitrust, by 
proposing to eliminate power, thus offers a solution in which 
firms can be free to act unregulated, but the public need not be 
concerned because the businesses thus freed lack appreciable 
power. 
Any effort to deal with the major macro problems that con-
front the economy requires challenges to existing political pow-
ers. To succeed, programs will have to work effectively where 
they have not in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
From whatever perspective one views macroeconomic 
problems, market power is a factor with an impact. A pro-com-
petitive policy is desirable; experience in the last two decades 
suggests that many would find its importance greater if asked 
today then if asked twenty years ago.118 . Nonetheless, that the 
stick of competition is more likely to serve the ends of macro-
policy than the carrot of market power, despite the traditional 
consensus as to the desirability of competition, is not a univer-
sally held belief. Control of market power is just one factor in 
dealing with macroeconomic phenomenon. An active policy of 
reducing market power should be coupled with a willingness to 
encourage more government aid and support where needed by 
participants in the competitive process. Government must also 
stand ready to. aid in establishment of alternative means to 
achieve economic functions and to help create different market 
solutions as the need emerges. 
In discussing market power and its usefulness as a guide to 
policy, a recurring theme is the dynamic character of economic 
life. This dynamic suggests that even a greatly altered corporate 
world, aided by revised public support, could produce at least as 
efficiently as the incumbent economic order. Its potentially 
greater dynamism and reduced corporate power would make it a 
more socially attractive economic world in which to live. 
m Mueller, Antitrust in a Planned Economy: An Anachronism or an Essential Com-
plement?, 9 J. EcoN. ISSUES 159_ (1975). 

